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THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN THE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES ACT: A 30 FOR 30 SHORT  
JOHNNY PARKER * 
Debt collectors generate more complaints to the FTC than 
any other industry. Although many debt collectors are 
careful to comply with consumer protection laws, others 
engage in illegal conduct. Some collectors harass and 
threaten consumers, demand larger payments than the law 
allows, refuse to verify disputed debts, and disclose debts 
to consumers’ employers, co-workers, family members, 
and friends. Debt collection abuses cause harms that 
financially vulnerable consumers can ill afford.  Many 
consumers pay collectors money they do not owe and fall 
deeper into debt, while others suffer invasions of their 
privacy, job loss, and domestic instability.1   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first place to look for answers to what is or is not permitted when 
dealing with a debt collector is the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA or the Act).  The basic provisions of the law fall into three 
broadly defined categories—prohibitions, required disclosures, and civil 
liability.2  Prohibited conduct includes: (1) communication with the 
consumer at any unusual or inconvenient time or place3 and, with a few 
exceptions, communications with third parties;4 (2) “conduct the natural 
consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse[;]”5 (3) the use of 
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University College of Law. 
1 Debt Collection: Federal Trade Commission Protecting America’s Consumers, 
FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/consumer-finance/debt-
collection (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
2 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012). 
3 § 1692c(a)(1). 
4 § 1692c(b).  
5 § 1692d. 
202 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [43:201 
 
“any false, deceptive, or misleading representation[;]”6 (4) the use of unfair 
and unconscionable means to collect any debt;7 and, (5) furnishing 
deceptive forms.8  The prohibitions against harassment or abuse, false or 
misleading representations, and unfair practices are illustrated by lists of 
per se violations.9  These lists are intended only as examples of prohibited 
conduct and are not all-inclusive.10 
Couched in the broadest possible language, the civil liability provision 
of the law provides: “Except as otherwise provided by this section, any 
debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter 
with respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .”11 
As a consequence of the phrase “any person,” the civil liability 
provision has been construed to provide standing to enforce the provisions 
of the FDCPA to debtors and non-debtors, in addition to consumers.12  
However, the standing inquiry turns upon the section of the law allegedly 
violated.13  For example, § 1692e states, “A debt collector may not use any 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with 
the collection of any debt.”14  When read in conjunction with the civil 
liability provision, § 1692e has been construed to mean “any aggrieved 
party may bring an action under § 1692e.”15  
                                                                                                                          
6 § 1692e. 
7 § 1692f. 
8 § 1692j. 
9 §§ 1692d–1692f.  
10 Id.  In each of these sections the Code expressly provides that: “Without limiting the 
general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this 
section . . . .”  See also Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993); McMillan 
v.  Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006). 
11 § 1692k(a). 
12 See Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2006). 
13 Barasch v. Estate Info. Servs., No. 07-CV-1963, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79338, at *5, 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2009). 
14 § 1692e. 
15 Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 649–50 (6th Cir. 1994). For 
purposes of a § 1692e claim, standing has been construed to include persons who have been 
harmed by an improper debt collection practice, someone standing in the alleged debtor’s 
shoes, or someone who has suffered injurious exposure to the communication.  See Dutton 
v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D.Del. 1992); Sibersky v. Goldstein, 155 F. App’x 10, 
11 (2d Cir. 2005); Guillory v. WFS Fin., Inc., No. C 06-06963, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24910, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007).   
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Despite the broad language of the civil liability provision, “only a 
consumer has standing to sue under particular sections of the FDCPA that 
specifically regulate communications with the consumer.”16  Section 
1692g is such a provision.17 Successful litigants who sue to enforce the 
FDCPA’s provisions may recover actual damages, statutory damages, and 
attorney fees.18 
The FDCPA applies to the collection of personal, family, or household 
debts only.19  The Act’s protections to consumers are contingent upon the 
Act’s definition of the terms “communication,”20 “consumer,”21  
“creditor,”22 “debt,”23 and “debt collector.”24 The FDCPA’s protective 
power primarily emphasizes communication between a debt collector and 
                                                                                                                          
16 Barasch, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79338, at *5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Several sections of the FDCPA, including § 1692g, restrict the scope of 
the FDCPA’s application by including the word “consumer” in the text.  See, e.g., Crafton 
v. Law Firm of Jonathan Levine, 957 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 2013); Tedeschi v. 
Kason Credit Corp., No. 3:10CV00612, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51806, at *8 (D. Conn. 
Apr. 15, 2014).  
17 § 1692g(a).  See also Crafton, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.  
18 § 1692k(a)(1)–(3). 
19 § 1692a(5). 
20 “The term ‘communication’ means the conveying of information regarding a debt 
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  § 1692a(2). 
21  “The term ‘consumer’ means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to 
pay any debt.”  § 1692a(3). 
22 § 1692a(4) (“The term ‘creditor’ means any person who offers or extends 
credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include 
any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in 
default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.”). 
23 § 1692a(5) (“The term ‘debt’ means any obligation or alleged obligation of 
a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, 
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such 
obligation has been reduced to judgment.”). 
24 § 1692a(6) (“The term ‘debt collector’ means any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal 
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or 
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 
owed or due another.”)  The term does not include persons expressly excluded 
from the definition of “debt collector” in the Act. See § 1692a(6)(A)–(F).  
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consumer.  Consequently, a court must determine whether a 
communication between a debt collector and consumer has occurred before 
imposing liability under the FDCPA.25   
The FDCPA establishes certain rights for consumers whose debts are 
placed in the hands of professional debt collectors for collection.  It is 
largely a strict liability statute. 26  Thus, debt collectors are liable 
regardless of whether the violation was knowing or intentional.27  Because 
the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, proof of one violation is sufficient to 
support judgment in favor of the plaintiff.28   
The FDCPA focuses on collection methods and not whether the 
underlying debt is valid.29  Consequently, the plaintiff has standing to sue 
under the FDCPA regardless of whether a valid debt exists.30  “A basic 
tenet of the [FDCPA]” is that every consumer, even one who mismanages 
his or her personal finances by defaulting on his or her debts, is entitled 
“to be treated in a reasonable and civil manner.”31  Thus, a plaintiff who 
                                                                                                                          
25 The FDCPA does not apply to creditors seeking to collect their own debts.  See 
Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2003); F.T.C. v. Check 
Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2007); Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 
147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1998).  However, a creditor, seeking to collect its own debt, 
becomes subject to the Act if it uses a name other than its own which would indicate that a 
third party is collecting or seeking to collect such debt.  See Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 
FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 2012); Maguire, 147 F.3d at 235.  “A creditor uses a 
name other than its own when it uses a name that implies that a third party is involved in 
collecting its debts, ‘pretends to be someone else’ or ‘uses a pseudonym or alias.’” 
Macguire, 147 F.3d at 235.  A creditor is not required to use its full business name or its 
name of incorporation when collecting its own debts.  Id.  Commonly used acronyms, the 
name under which it ordinarily transacts business, or any name that it has used from the 
inception of the credit relation are sufficient to exempt creditors from the application of the 
FDCPA.  Id.  
26 See Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008); Owen v. 
I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2011).  
27 See Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1005; Owen, 629 F.3d at 1270.   
28 Macarz v. Transworld Sys. Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 368, 373 (D. Conn. 1998); Clomon 
v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).  
29 Senftle v. Landau, 390 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464, 470 (D. Md. 2005). 
30 Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982). 
31 McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 762 n. 10 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1324 (7th Cir. 
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“owes a legitimate debt has standing to sue [under the FDCPA] if the Act 
is violated by an [unscrupulous] debt collector.”32  
This Article examines 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and its requirement that debt 
collectors provide consumers certain specified information when 
attempting to collect debts.33  Part II sets the stage for this examination by 
providing a general overview of the nature, character, and content of the 
FDCPA.34  Thereafter, Part II(A) discusses the mandate that debt collectors 
provide the information specified in § 1692g.35  It also explains the 
objective of § 1692g and the intent that the information serves 
consumers.36  Part II(B) explores each subsection of § 1692g 
individually.37  It examines decisional law explaining the manner, content, 
and context in which the specified information must be conveyed to 
consumers.38  Part II(C) identifies the two ways the FDCPA can be 
violated and discusses the least sophisticated consumer legal standard 
involved in one of the violations. 39  This section also discusses the proof 
requirement under this standard. 40  Finally, this Article expressly ends 
where it implicitly began: consumers only have one recourse if they are to 
protect themselves from overzealous debt collectors—to know their rights 
and to demand accountability.41 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Information Required To Be Communicated 
In addition to the prohibitions against “false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation[s]” and “conduct the natural consequence of which is to 
harass, oppress, or abuse,”42 the Act affords consumers with specified 
rights to information about the alleged debt. The right to verify or validate 
                                                                                                                          
32 Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
33 See infra Part II.A. 
34 See infra Part II.A. 
35 See infra Part II.A. 
36 See infra Part II.A. 
37 See infra Part II.B. 
38 See infra Part II.B. 
39 See infra Part II.C. 
40 See infra Part II.C. 
41 See infra Part III. 
42 §§ 1692d–1692e (2012). 
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the existence of the debt is chief among these rights.43  Not all 
communications from a debt collector to a consumer need to be in 
writing.44  However, unless the required information is provided in the 
initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692g requires a debt collector to send a written communication 
informing the consumer of his or her right to dispute and obtain specific 
information regarding the alleged debt.45  The debt collector typically 
sends this communication in the form of a collection letter.  
Section 1692g “is aimed at preventing collection efforts based on 
mistaken information.”46  It is a strict liability provision and is violated 
whenever a debt collector fails to provide the required notice, regardless of 
whether the lack of disclosure was egregious or caused any actual harm.47  
Section 1692g restricts the scope of the FDCPA’s application by including 
the word “consumer” in the text.48  According to the Act: 
Within five days after the initial communication with a 
consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a 
debt collector shall, unless the following information is 
contained in the initial communication or the consumer 
has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice 
containing— 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty 
days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the 
debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be 
valid by the debt collector; 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt 
collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the 
debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector 
                                                                                                                          
43 § 1692g(a). 
44 § 1692a(2). 
45 § 1692g(a). 
46 Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2003). 
47 See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1996). 
48 See § 1692g.  The FDCPA defines “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or 
allegedly obligated to pay any debt.”  § 1692a(3). 
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will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment 
against the consumer and a copy of such verification or 
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt 
collector; and 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written 
request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will 
provide the consumer with the name and address of the 
original creditor, if different from the current creditor.49  
The initial written communication must also disclose that the “debt 
collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained 
will be used for that purpose.”50 
Congress’s use of the term “shall” unambiguously manifests the 
mandatory nature of the provision’s notice requirement, at least as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has established in other contexts.51  In fact, every circuit 
court of appeals to address the issue of whether or not the information 
required by § 1692g is collectively mandatory has answered in the 
affirmative.52 The information required by § 1692g is required “regardless 
of whether validation notice is needed or not.”53 Thus, even if the 
consumer already knows or has access to the information, it still must be 
provided in the collection letter.   
The FDCPA does not assume that a consumer who receives a 
collection letter is aware of her rights.54 “Instead, the Act requires the debt 
collector, as the party in the better position to know the law, to inform the 
consumer of that right.”55  The validation notice guarantees that the 
consumer receives the information necessary to challenge the alleged debt 
before making payments to the independent collection agency.56  
                                                                                                                          
49 § 1692g(a)(1)–(5).  
50 § 1692e(11). 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989); Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569–70 (1988). 
52 See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc. 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008); Frey v. 
Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1518–19 (6th Cir. 1992); McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 
455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006); Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1099–1100 
(9th Cir. 2012); Ferree v. Marianos, No. 97-6061, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *6 
(10th Cir. Nov. 3, 1997). 
53 Frey, 970 F.2d at 1519. 
54 Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 90. 
55 Id. 
56 Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996). 
208 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [43:201 
 
Section 1692g only requires a debt collector to send the consumer a 
written notice containing the required information.57  It does not require 
the debt collector to verify actual receipt of the notice by the consumer.58  
However, because the objective of § 1692g is to inform consumers of their 
rights,59 merely sending the notice to any address without knowing if it is 
valid or if it belongs to the consumer might frustrate the purpose of the 
statute and result in an “abusive debt collection practice.”60   
B. Failure to Provide the Required Information 
A debt collector can violate § 1692g in two ways.61  First, failing to 
provide the information required by the statute constitutes a violation.62  
The second violation occurs when other language in the collection letter 
contradicts or overshadows the statutorily mandated language.63   
1.  Subsection (a)(1):  Amount of Debt 
Section 1692g(a)(1) requires that the debt collector send the amount of 
the debt to the consumer in a written notice, “unless [that] information is 
contained in the initial communication or the consumer has already paid 
the debt.”64  Courts have held that a notice is inadequate if it does not 
indicate that the amount due reflects the current balance, and interest may 
                                                                                                                          
57 See § 1692g(a).  See also Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 1997); Mahon 
v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cnty., Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1999). 
58 See Mahon, 171 F.3d at 1201.  It is unsettled whether “send” implies receipt by the 
debtor or simply mailing by the debt collector.  Compare Maloy v. Phillips, 64 F.3d 607, 
608 (11th Cir. 1995) (the statute of limitations for an FDCPA violation begins running as of 
the date the collection letter is mailed), with Bates v. C&S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 
868 (2d Cir. 1992) (an FDCPA violation does not occur until the debtor’s receipt of the 
collection notice).  
59 See Kim v. Gordon, No. CV 10-1086, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85353, at * 8 (D. Or. 
Aug. 1, 2011); Laprade v. Abramson, No. 97-10, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9009, at * 13 
(D.D.C. June 19, 1997). 
60 Campbell v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-177, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5762, 
at *32 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2009).   
61 See DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 2001); McMillan 
v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006).  
62 See DeSantis, 269 F.3d at 161; McMillan, 455 F.3d at 758.   
63 See DeSantis, F.3d at 161; McMillan, 455 F.3d at 758.   
64 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) (2012).  
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be added to the total.65 “[O]ther courts have held that a [collection letter] 
satisfies the statute if it states the total amount of the debt (including 
interest and any other charges) as of the date the letter is sent.”66   
In Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, 
L.L.C.,67 the court created a “safe harbor” formula for compliance with 
§ 1692g(a)(1).68  The collection letter in Miller said that the “‘unpaid 
principal balance’ of the loan was $178,844.65, but added that ‘this 
amount does not include accrued but unpaid interest, unpaid late charges, 
escrow advances or other charges for preservation and protection of the 
lender’s interest in the property, as authorized by your loan agreement.’”69  
It also provided “[t]he amount to reinstate or pay off your loan changes 
daily.  You may call our office for complete reinstatement and payoff 
figures.”70  An 800 number was also provided.71 
According to the court in Miller, this information did not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (a)(1) because “[t]he unpaid principal balance 
is not the debt; it is only a part of the debt; the Act requires statement of 
the debt.”72  In a case where the amount due varies daily, the Miller court 
would accept this type of statement:  
As of the date of this letter, you owe $__ [the exact 
amount due].  Because of interest, late charges, and other 
charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on 
the day you pay may be greater.  Hence, if you pay the 
amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary 
after we receive your check, in which event we will inform 
you before depositing the check for collection.  For further 
information, write the undersigned or call 1–800– [phone 
number].73 
                                                                                                                          
65 Carr v. Northland Grp., No. 3:12-CV-378, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174930, at *10 
(E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 2012) (quoting King v. Alliance Receivables Mgmt., Inc., No. 2:12-
CV-314, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14428, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
66  Id. at 10–11. 
67  214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000). 
68 Id. at 876. 
69  Id. at 875. 
70  Id. 
71 Id. 
72  Id. 
73 Id. at 876. 
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So long as the information provided in this statement is clear and accurate, 
the debt collector will not violate the “amount of the debt” provision.74 
2. Subsection (a)(2): Name of the Creditor and Least Sophisticated 
Consumer 
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), “[w]ithin five days after the 
initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of 
any debt, a debt collector shall . . . send the consumer a written notice 
containing . . . (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.”75 
“Limited case law exists regarding violations of § 1692g(a)(2) for a debt 
collector’s failure to identify the creditor’s name in a communication with 
the consumer.”76  It has also been suggested that the language of 
§ 1692g(a)(2) has not been strictly applied.77  Nevertheless, the statute 
requires the collector to provide this information, so a plaintiff is not 
required to demonstrate that it is material to the communication.78  
§ 1692g(a)(2) claims are generally analyzed from the perspective of 
the least sophisticated consumer.79  Pursuant to the least sophisticated 
consumer standard, § 1692g(a)(2) has been violated when the least 
sophisticated consumer would not deduce from reading the collection letter 
that the name of the creditor seeking collection is the creditor to whom the 
debt is owed.80  
Courts have struggled to consistently determine whether § 1692g(a)(2) 
has been violated in the context of home mortgage loans.  For example, in 
Olson v. Wilford, Geske, & Cook, P.A.,81 the defendant, who was a law 
firm, sent the plaintiffs a form collection letter that provided, in pertinent 
part: 
Our office has been retained by Bank of America, N.A. 
and The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New 
                                                                                                                          
74  Id. 
75 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) (2012).  
76 Devito v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman, LLC, 908 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (D.N.J. 
2012). 
77 Id.  
78 Lee v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, 926 F. Supp. 2d 482, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
79 See, e.g., Devito, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 568–69; Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 
374 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
80 Sparkman, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 300–01. 
81 No. 12-1895, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2013).  
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York, as Trustee, for The Benefit of the Certificateholders 
of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-33CB 
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, Series 2005-33CB, 
which is the creditor, or the servicer for the creditor, to 
which your mortgage debt is owed.  Your loan is in default 
under the terms of your mortgage dated April 28, 2005, 
and the creditor has referred this matter to our office to 
commence foreclosure proceedings . . . .82 
The plaintiffs claimed the letter violated § 1692g(a)(2) because it did not 
identify the creditor as required by the section.83  According to the 
plaintiffs, the letter stated that Wilford had “been retained by two different 
banks[,] . . . that one or both banks is the trustee [for the Certificate holder] 
and that one of these entities is either ‘the creditor, or servicer for the 
creditor, to which your mortgage debt is owed.’”84  While acknowledging 
that the letter was poorly drafted, the court in Olson found that the letter 
identified “both entities as ‘the creditor, or the servicer for the creditor,’” 
and thus, “in fact contain[ed] the name of the creditor to whom the debt 
[was] owed.”85  Consequently, it concluded that the letter did not violate 
subsection (a)(2).86 
In Zapp v. Trott & Trott, P.C.,87 the court addressed the exact same 
issue as in Olson and reached a contrary decision.88  In Zapp, the plaintiff 
received a letter from Trott & Trott that provided, in relevant part: “This 
office represents CitiMortgage, Inc., which is the creditor to which your 
mortgage debt is owed or the loan servicer for the creditor to which the 
mortgage debt is owed.”89 
Plaintiff alleged that the letter violated the FDCPA because it failed to 
identify her creditor as required by § 1692g(a)(2).90  Defendant cited 
“Olson v. Wilford, Geske & Cook . . . for the proposition that the same 
language at issue here—‘the creditor to which your mortgage debt is owed 
or the loan servicer for the creditor to which the mortgage debt is owed’—
                                                                                                                          
82 Id. at *1–2. 
83 Id. at *3–4. 
84 Id. at *8 (quoting Complaint at 2, Olson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365).  
85 Id. at *8–9.  
86 Id. at *9. 
87 No. 13-12998, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013). 
88 Id. at *2, *6.  
89 Id. at *1 (quoting Complaint at 14, Zapp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511). 
90 Id. at *2. 
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is not violative the FDCPA.”91  The court in Zapp distinguished Olson on 
the basis that “[t]he Olson court’s interpretation—that a collection letter 
must simply ‘contain’ the name of the creditor—is contrary to the ‘least 
sophisticated consumer’ standard and to other cases requiring that the 
information be clearly and effectively conveyed.”92  Thus, the court 
concluded that plaintiff had stated a claim for a violation of § 1692g(a)(2) 
because the least sophisticated consumer could be confused by the manner 
in which the required information was provided.93 
While the Olson and Zapp holdings seem to be in conflict, the cases 
can be harmonized on the basis of the underlying legal theory.  The court 
in Olson viewed the underlying legal theory as the failure to provide the 
required information,94 while the court in Zapp analyzed the case from the 
perspective of a failure to provide the required information in a clear and 
effective manner.95 The least sophisticated consumer standard tends to be 
accorded significantly greater weight, due to its fact-sensitive nature. 
3. Subsection (a)(3): Right to Dispute Validity of Debt 
“Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 1692g(a) contain the validation 
notice—the statements that inform the consumer how to obtain verification 
of the debt and that he has thirty days in which to do so.”96 Subsection 
(a)(3) requires debt collectors to inform consumers of their right to dispute 
the validity of the debt or any portion thereof within thirty days after 
receipt of the notice, not within thirty days of the date of the letter.97  The 
                                                                                                                          
91 Id. at *5–6 (quoting Complaint at 14, Zapp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511). 
92 Id. at *6. 
93 Id. at *6. The FDCPA does not apply to mortgage servicers as long as the debt was 
not in default at the time it was assigned.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2012).  Determining 
which definition, “debt collector” or “mortgage servicer,” applies depends on the status of 
the debt at the time it was acquired, which is governed by § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).  See, e.g., 
Pascal v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 33350, at *10–12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 11, 2013).  
94 Olson v. Wilford, Geske, & Cook, P.A., No. 12-1895, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365, 
at *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2013).  
95 Zapp v. Trott & Trott, P.C., No. 13-12998, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511, at *6 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013).  
96 Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353–54 (3d Cir. 2000). 
97 See § 1692g(a)(3).  See also Edstrom v. All Servs. and Processing, No. C04-1514, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2773, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2005); Cavallaro v. Law Office of 
Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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failure to include in the notice that “any portion” of the debt, such as 
interest, finance charges, or penalties, can be disputed violates the 
FDCPA.98 According to the plain language of the statute, the letter must 
also include some language that makes it clear that the “debt collector” 
may assume the debt valid for collection purposes.99  A statement that 
imposes limitations, conditions, or requirements on the consumer’s ability 
to exercise the right to dispute the debt or any portion thereof violates the 
FDCPA.100 
Courts, however, disagree on whether the dispute referred to in 
subsection (a)(3) must be made in writing to the debt collector.101  In 
Graziano v. Harrison,102 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is the 
first and only circuit court to deviate from the plain meaning of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692g(a)(3).  In Graziano, an attorney who operated a debt collection 
practice sent a notice of a delinquent debt to a debtor.103  The notice 
informed the debtor that “unless he disputed the debt in writing within 
thirty days, the debt would be assumed valid.”104  The debtor posited that, 
because the statutory language of subsection (a)(3) does not require a 
dispute to be in writing, the attorney’s letter violated § 1692g (a)(3) of the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.105  The attorney countered that while 
                                                                                                                          
98 See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982); Smith v. 
Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992); Lombardi v. Columbia 
Recovery Grp LLC, No. C12-1250, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146375, at *7 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 9, 2013) (explaining that the statement should at a minimum refer to “portion” of the 
debt). 
99 See Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Assocs. LLC, No. 3:13CV543, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30898, at *23–24 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2014); Iyamu v. Clarfield, Okon, Salomone & 
Pincus, P.L., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2013).  
100 See Lombardi, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146375, at *11. 
101 Compare Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (violation notice 
requirement that dispute be in writing does not violate § 1692g(a)(3)), and Hooks v. 
Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC., 717 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2013) (a consumer must 
send the debt collector written notice of the dispute), with Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 
430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (disputes are not required to be made to the debt 
collector in writing), and Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (validation notice’s requirement that dispute be in writing violates subsection 
(a)(3)). 
102 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).  
103 Id. at 109. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 112. 
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§ 1692g(a)(3) does not contain an expressed writing requirement, 
subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) of the same provision contained a requirement 
of writing, which demonstrates a Congressional intent that all disputes be 
in writing.106  According to the attorney, Congress inadvertently omitted 
the requirement of a writing in subsection (a)(3).107  After comparing the 
statement required by subsection (a)(3) with those required by subsections 
(a)(4) and (a)(5), the court in Graziano observed: 
Adopting Graziano’s reading of the statute would thus 
create a situation in which, upon the debtor’s non-written 
dispute, the debt collector would be without any statutory 
ground for assuming that the debt was valid, but 
nevertheless would not be required to verify the debt or to 
advise the debtor of the identity of the original creditor 
and would be permitted to continue debt collection efforts.  
We see no reason to attribute to Congress an intent to 
create so incoherent a system.108 
The court in Graziano further reasoned that a writing requirement creates a 
lasting record of the debt dispute, thus avoiding a source of conflict.109 
Nearly fifteen years after Graziano, the Ninth Circuit, in Camacho v.  
Bridgeport Fin. Inc.,110 addressed the issue of whether the imposition of an 
expressed writing requirement on a consumer’s rights under subsection 
(a)(3) violates the FDCPA.111  In Camacho, the court concluded that a 
consumer need not send a writing to contest the debt under 
§ 1692g(a)(3).112  Relying on the plain meaning of the words, the court 
reasoned that the contrasting writing requirements of § 1692g(a)(4) and 
(a)(5) manifested congressional intent not to impose a writing requirement 
on § 1692g(a)(3).113  The court concluded that this interpretation was 
sound because the statute provides for other protections independent of 
subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) in the event of an oral dispute, and those 
protections depend only on whether a debt was disputed, not whether there 





110 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). 
111 Id. at 1079. 
112 Id. at 1082. 
113 Id. at 1081. 
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was a prior writing.114  The Camacho court also reasoned that the 
legislative purpose of allowing alleged debtors to question and challenge 
the initial communication of a collection agency is furthered by permitting 
oral objections.115  Finally, the court observed that its reading—by which 
some rights are triggered by an oral dispute but others require a written 
statement—would not mislead consumers.116  While the Third Circuit has 
reaffirmed Graziano,117 two other circuit courts have adopted the 
rationales and holding of the Ninth Circuit in Camacho.118  
Camacho only held that debt collectors could not expressly require that 
a § 1692g(a)(3) dispute be in writing.119  Pursuant to Camacho, the 
FDCPA allows a debtor to dispute a debt orally or in writing.120  The court 
in Camacho did not address the issue of whether the FDCPA prohibits a 
debt collector from implicitly requiring that the subsection (a)(3) dispute 
be in writing.121  However, this specific issue was addressed by the court in 
Riggs v. Prober & Raphael.122  Therein, the court concluded that such an 
implication did not violate subsection (a)(3) because “any confusion over 
what a consumer must do in writing, versus what she may do in writing, 
stems at least in part from the FDCPA itself.  It would be untenable to read 
the FDCPA to prohibit validation notices that simply mimic the statute’s 
own shortcomings.”123 
                                                                                                                          
114 Id. at 1081–82.  Once a consumer disputes a debt orally under subsection (a)(3), the 
debt collector must refrain from communicating the consumer’s credit information to others 
without disclosing the dispute.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (2012).  In addition, if the consumer 
owes multiple debts and makes a payment the debt collector may not apply the payment to 
a debt that has been orally disputed. § 1692h.  See also Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., 
Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2014). 
115 Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082. 
116 Id. 
117 Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d. Cir. 
2013). 
118 Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC., 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(validation notice’s requirement that dispute be in writing violates subsection (a)(3)); Clark 
v. Absolute Collection Serv. Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2014) (validation notice’s 
requirement that dispute be in writing violates subsection (a)(3)). 
119 Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082.  
120 Id. at 1081–82. 
121 Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012). 
122 681 F.3d at 1102. 
123 Id. at 1103. 
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4.  Subsection (a)(4): Verification of Debt 
Section 1692g(a)(4) requires the debt collector to include a written 
statement informing the consumer that if he or she informs the debt 
collector “within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, 
is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy 
of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or 
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.”124  
Subsection (a)(4) expressly requires that the consumer be made aware that 
this dispute must be provided in writing.125  The failure to include the word 
“writing” in the statement does not effectively convey to the consumer his 
rights and thus, constitutes a violation of the FDCPA.126  
The word “dispute” is a term of art in the FDCPA.127  Consequently, a 
consumer can dispute a debt for no reason at all.128  Therefore, the debt 
collector need not and may not require the consumer to “support [the] 
written dispute with documentation or explanation.”129  
“The text of § 1692g (a)(4) leaves no room for deviation.”130  It 
requires the debt collector, upon receipt of a written dispute from the 
consumer, to “obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment.”131  
If the validation notice makes any lesser representation, such as “might 
obtain” or “will try to obtain,” the letter violates § 1692g(a)(4).132 
A validation notice that uses the verbatim language of § 1692g(a)(4) 
does not violate the FDCPA.133  Likewise, a de minimis variance from the 
literal requirements of subsection (a)(4) does not violate the Act.134  For 
                                                                                                                          
124 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2012). 
125 See id. 
126 See, e.g., McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2003); 
Spira v. Consiglio, Parisi & Allen, No. 99-CV-870, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24497, at *13 
(E.D.N.Y Jan. 3, 2001). 
127 Gruber v. Creditors’ Prot. Servs., No. 12-C-1243, 2013 U.S Dist. LEXIS 68379, at 
*6 (E.D. Wis. May 14, 2013). 
128 See DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). 
129 See, e.g., King v. Int’l Data Servs., No. 01-00380, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26427, at 
*9, *12 (D. Haw. Aug. 5, 2002) (citing DeSantis, 269 F.3d at 162). 
130 Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs. Nos. 95 C 4919, 95 C 6665, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10883, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1996). 
131 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2012).  
132 Jang, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10883, at *10–11. 
133 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d. 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).   
134 See Gruber, 2013 U.S Dist. LEXIS 68379, at *4.  
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example, in the appellate case of Gruber v. Creditors’ Prot. Servs., Inc.,135 
the collection letter, in response to the requirement of subsection (a)(4), 
provided: “If you notify this office within 30 days from receiving this 
notice, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of the 
judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification.”136  This 
statement, according to the debtor, violated the FDCPA because it omitted 
the phrase “that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed.”137  Thus, 
according to the plaintiffs, the statement “direct[ed] the consumer to 
request verification instead of directing the consumer to dispute the 
debt.”138 
The court rejected this argument and concluded that “a request to 
verify the existence of a debt constitutes a ‘dispute’ under the 
[FDCPA].”139  The court further opined that “unsophisticated consumers” 
cannot be expected to assert legal rights precisely, so if a consumer sought 
verification, he would be disputing the debt for all practical purposes and 
would be protected according to the Act.140  
5. Subsection (a)(5): Name of Original Creditor Versus Current 
Creditor 
Subsection (a)(5) requires that the debt collector provide a statement 
that, upon the consumers “written request,” the debt collector will provide 
the contact information of the original creditor, if different from the current 
creditor.141  As stated in the context of the discussion of subsection (a)(4), 
if the collection letter uses the verbatim language of the statute, the 
FDCPA has not been violated.142  One caveat to this rule exists where 
other language in the collection letter contradicts the verbatim language of 
the statute.143   
                                                                                                                          
135 742 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 2014). 
136 Id. at 273.  
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 274. 
140 Id. 
141 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) (2012).  
142 See supra Part II.B.4.  See also Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d. 1078, 
1082 (9th Cir. 2005).  
143 Compare Ardino v. Lyons, No. 11-848, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143586, at *20–32 
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011), with Philip v. Sardo & Batista, P.C., No. 11-4773, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 130267, at *6–9 (D.N.J Nov. 10, 2011). 
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Section 1692g(a)(4)–(5) expressly states a debt collector must inform 
the consumer that the request has to be in writing.144  Every district court to 
address this issue has held that omission of the phrase “in writing” in a 
collection letter violates subsections (a)(4)–(5) of the FDCPA.145  The 
single rationale in these cases is that oral notice of dispute of a debt has 
different legal consequences than written notice.146  For example, 
§ 1692g(b) provides that if the consumer notifies the debt collector of a 
dispute in writing within the thirty-day period, the debt collector must 
cease collection efforts until he obtains the verification or information 
required by § 1692g(a)(4)–(5).147  However, “if the consumer disputes the 
debt orally rather than in writing, the consumer losses the protections 
afforded by § 1692g(b); the debt collector is under no obligation to cease 
all collection efforts and obtain verification of the debt.”148  Thus, debtors 
can trigger the rights under subsection (a)(3) by either an oral or written 
dispute, while debtors can trigger the rights under subsections (a)(4) and 
(a)(5) only through written dispute.149 
One issue that has divided the federal district courts is whether debt 
collectors must comply with the literal requirements of subsection (a)(5) 
where the current creditor listed in the collection letter is the original 
creditor.  For example, in the district court case of McCabe v. Crawford & 
Co.,150 the collection letter provided, in pertinent part: 
Unless we hear from you within thirty (30) days after the 
receipt of this letter disputing the claim, Federal Law 
provides that this debt will be assumed to be valid and 
owing.  In the event you contact us and dispute the charges 
owed, we will promptly furnish you with any and all 
documentation to substantiate the claim.151 
                                                                                                                          
144 §§ 1692g(a)(4)–(5). 
145 See, e.g., Osborn v. EKPSZ, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 859, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2011).  
146 Id. at 869.  
147 § 1692g(b).  
148 Osborn, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 869.  See also supra note 114 for discussion of the legal 
consequences of disputing a debt orally.  
149  Osborn, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 869 (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 
1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005). 
150 210 F.R.D. 631 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
151 Id. at 636. 
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The consumer argued that the debt collector’s letter violated subsection 
(a)(5) because it failed to provide the name and address of the original 
creditor.152  The court, however, disagreed and concluded that the FDCPA 
did not require such notice where the creditors remained the same.153  
Similarly, in Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C.,154 
the plaintiffs alleged a § 1692g(a)(5) violation because the defendant failed 
to provide the name and address of the original creditor or only provided 
the name but not the address.155  The defendant argued that it did not have 
to include “the 1692g(a)(5) language in its debt collection letter when the 
current creditor [was] the original creditor.”156 
According to the court in Shimek, “It is undisputed that the letters 
indicate that the homeowners associations are both the original and current 
creditors, Defendant’s letter does not include the Section 1692g(a)(5) 
language quoted above, and Defendant’s letter does not provide the 
address of the homeowners associations.”157  Based on its interpretation of 
the plain statutory language and the plaintiff’s failure to cite any authority 
to the contrary, the Shimek court concluded that the “[d]efendant [had] 
complied with the FDCPA by providing the name of the creditor to whom 
the debt was owed.”158  The court based its rationale on the fact that the 
letter sent to the debtor expressly identified the homeowners association as 
the original creditor, and the association was the current creditor when the 
defendant sent the letter.159  This reasoning, while not novel,160 has 
influenced federal district courts in numerous circuits.161 
The extent to which the court in Shimek was influenced by the 
plaintiff’s failure to cite authority to the contrary is uncertain.  That said, 
authority to the contrary does exist.  For example, in Edstrom v. All 
                                                                                                                          
152 Id. at 639.  
153 Id. 
154 323 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2003). 
155 Id. at 1347–48. 
156 Id. at 1348. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1348–49. 
159 Id. at 1348. 
160 See, e.g., Cavallaro v. Law Office of Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
161 See, e.g., Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132 (W.D. Wis. 
2004); Forsberg v. Fidelity Nat’l Credit Servs., Ltd., No. 03CV2193, 2004 WL 3510771 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2004). 
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Services and Processing,162 the plaintiff argued that the debt collector 
violated subsection (a)(5) where it merely provided the name but not the 
address of the original creditor.163  The defendant contended that it was not 
required to provide this information where the consumer already knew 
it.164  According to the court, 
The letter included the name of the original creditor, the 
Apple Hill Association, but did not provide the 
Association’s address or notify plaintiffs of their right to 
request the address. While defendant contends that 
plaintiff knew the Association’s address because they sent 
a notice to the Association within the thirty-day time 
period, this is not relevant to my determination of whether 
the letter violated section 1692g.165 
Relying on the unambiguous language of § 1692g, the court concluded that 
the notice “must contain the enumerated disclosures.”166  Thus, the failure 
of the defendant’s collection letter to provide the required information 
violated the Act.167 
Although inconsistent, the decisional law regarding whether a debt 
collector must provide the statement required by subsection (a)(5) is based 
on various interpretations of the literal language of § 1692g(a)(5).  Courts 
that adhere to the view that the collector is not required to provide the 
statement where the current creditor and original creditor are the same 
construe the phrase “if different from the current creditor”168 as a condition 
precedent to the statutory obligation to provide the statement in the first 
instance.  However, this interpretation is premised on the original creditor 
and the current creditor being the same and the collection letter expressly 
stating the name of the creditor. 
                                                                                                                          
162 No. C04-1514, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2773 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2005). 
163 Id. at *10–12. 
164 Id. at *12. 
165 Id. at *11–12.  
166  Id. at *12. 
167 Id. at *10–11. 
168 15. U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) (2012).  
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C. Other Language in the Collection Letter Contradicts or Overshadows 
the Required Information 
Courts have long interpreted § 1692g to require that the validation 
notice be conveyed effectively to consumers.169  Mere inclusion of the 
required information does not automatically satisfy this requirement.170  
Rather, in order to be conveyed effectively, the required information must 
be placed in such a way as to be easily readable and must be prominent 
enough to be noticed by the least sophisticated consumer.171  The 
information must also not be overshadowed or contradicted by other 
language in the initial communication.172 
Decisional law has not specified which part of § 1692g is the source of 
the “overshadowing” prohibition.  Some courts have analyzed the 
prohibition from the perspective of § 1692g(a),173 while others refer to 
§ 1692g generally.174  “In 2006, Congress amended the FDCPA 
by . . . adding two sentences to the end of subsection (b) of § 1692g.”175  
Those new sentences provide: 
Collection activities and communications that do not 
otherwise violate this subchapter [i.e. the FDCPA] may 
continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection 
(a) of this section unless the consumer has notified the 
debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the 
debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name 
and address of the original creditor.  Any collection 
activities and communication during the 30-day period 
may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure 
                                                                                                                          
169 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Payco-Gen. 
Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. S. Oregon Credit Serv., 
Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988). 
170 See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 484; Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225. 
171 See United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225. 
172 See Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d at 139; Miller, 943 F.2d at 484. 
173 See, e.g., Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d at 139; Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008). 
174 See, e.g., Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 53 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (W.D. Va. 
1999); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 411, 415–16 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
175 Garcia-Contreras v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, 775 F. Supp. 2d 808, 813 (M.D. N.C. 
2011).  
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of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the 
name and address of the original creditor.176  
Since the 2006 amendment to § 1692g(b), courts have reached differing 
conclusions as to whether overshadowing claims involving initial 
communications are governed by the new language in § 1692g(b), still 
implicitly governed by § 1692g(a), or both.177 
Courts employ a least sophisticated or unsophisticated consumer 
standard to determine whether the statutorily required language is 
contradicted or overshadowed by other language in the collection letter.178  
This objective inquiry is directed toward protecting all consumers, from 
the gullible to the astute.179  “The test is how the least sophisticated 
consumer—one not having the astuteness of a [lawyer] or even the 
sophistication of the average, every day, common consumer—understands 
the notice he or she receives.”180  The manner in which the least 
sophisticated consumer standard is applied in the context of an 
overshadowing claim is affected by the pleading, which, in turn, dictates 
the proof requirement.  For example, if the consumer is seeking actual 
damages, proof that a plaintiff read the letter and was misled is required to 
prove that other language in the collection letter overshadowed the 
statutorily required information.181  Ultimately, the evidence must 
demonstrate that the least sophisticated consumer would have been misled 
under similar circumstances.  Because the FDCPA does not impose a 
mandatory duty on consumers to read collection letters,182 proof that the 
                                                                                                                          
176 Garcias-Contreras, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 813–14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2012)). 
177 For a detailed discussion of the legal implications of the source of an 
“overshadowing” claim, see Garcia-Contreras, 775 F. Supp. 2d 808.  See also Osborn v. 
EKPSZ, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing to subsection (b) of 
§ 1692g as the source of an “overshadowing claim”). 
178  See Ferree v. Marianos, No. 97-6061, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *7 (10th 
Cir. Nov. 3, 1997).  “The Seventh Circuit employs an ‘unsophisticated debtor’ standard, 
which appears to differ from the majority [least sophisticated consumer] test only in 
semantics.  Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2011). 
“The ‘least sophisticated debtor’ or ‘least sophisticated consumer’ standard is employed by 
the majority of circuits.” Id. 
179 Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012); Easterling v. 
Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2012).  
180 Ferree, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *5.  
181 Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997). 
182 See id.  
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letter was actually read by consumer is not necessary to allege a violation 
of the FDCPA when the consumer seeks statutory damages only.183  The 
only requirement is proof that the statute was violated.184  In this context, 
the least sophisticated consumer standard is used to discern whether a 
reasonable consumer would conclude, based on the language of the letter, 
that the statute has been violated.185 
The “least sophisticated consumer” is a hypothetical consumer who is 
“presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of information about the 
world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care.”186  The 
relevant question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that an 
unsophisticated consumer who has carefully considered the contents of the 
collection letter might be misled.187  The standard assumes that the 
collection letter at issue was carefully read in its entirety with an 
elementary level of understanding.188  It also assumes that technically 
false, immaterial representations are not likely to mislead the least 
sophisticated consumer.189  This standard protects debt collectors from 
“bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection [letters] by preserving 
[and presuming] a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level 
of understanding and willingness to read with care.”190 
The least sophisticated consumer standard dictates that the consumer 
show more than his own confusion.191  Instead, the consumer must show 
that a significant fraction of the population would have been misled by the 
content of the letter.192  This requirement can be met through the use of 
carefully designed and conducted consumer surveys or expert testimony.193  
Ultimately, a collection letter is considered “overshadowing or 
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contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain 
as to her rights.”194  Successful overshadowing claims typically involve 
collection letters, which imply that the consumer must take some action 
contrary to her statutory right to demand verification within the thirty-day 
period without explaining how that action and the right to demand 
verification tie together.195   
Where a collection letter is plainly misleading, the FDCPA creates 
liability without extrinsic proof.196  In other words, “if it is apparent” that 
the letter is confusing and plaintiff credibly testifies that he was confused, 
“no further evidence is necessary to create a triable issue.”197  It is only 
where “the letter itself does not plainly reveal that it would be confusing to 
a significant fraction of the population” that “the plaintiff must come 
forward with evidence beyond the letter and . . . his own self-serving 
[testimony] that the letter is confusing.”198 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Consumers should not be afraid or reluctant to deal with debt 
collectors.  Rather, they should face the fact with an understanding of their 
rights and protections.  Knowledge is power, and an informed consumer is 
an empowered consumer.   
Section 1692g of the FDCPA affords consumers the right to: (1) verify 
the existence and “validity” of a debt; (2) dispute the debt “or any portion 
thereof”; and, (3) obtain “the name and address of the . . . creditor, if 
different from the [original] creditor.”199  Consumers may exercise these 
rights without providing any reasons or explanations to collectors.200  If a 
consumer notifies a debt collector in writing within the thirty-day statutory 
period, the debt collector has two options.201  It can “provide the requested 
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validation[] and continue . . . collect[ion] [efforts],” or it can “cease all 
collection activities.”202 
The language of § 1692g (a)(1)-(5) is plain, simple, and concise.203  
Nevertheless, some debt collectors find it difficult to comply with its 
straightforward mandates.204  Consequently, § 1692g has become one of 
the most litigated sections of the FDCPA.205  In response to the abundance 
of litigation, the Seventh Circuit in Bartlett v. Heibl,206 offered the 
following form letter, which adheres to the requirements of the FDCPA.  
That letter, in pertinent part, provides: 
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this 
letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it.  If 
you don’t dispute it within that period, I’ll assume that it’s 
valid.  If you do dispute it—by notifying me in writing to 
that effect—I will, as required by the law, obtain and mail 
to you proof of the debt.  And if, within the same period, 
you request in writing the name and address of your 
original creditor, if the original creditor is different from 
the current creditor (Micard Service), I will furnish you 
with that information too.207 
Judge Posner, writing for the court, also advised and admonished debt 
collectors as follows: 
We cannot require debt collectors to use “our” form.  But 
of course if they depart from it, they do so at their risk.  
Debt collectors who want to avoid suits by disgruntled 
debtors standing on their statutory rights would be well 
advised to stick close to the form that we have drafted.  It 
would be a safe haven for them, at least in the Seventh 
Circuit.208   
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Despite the template offered by the court in Bartlett, debt collectors 
continue to take liberties with the validation notices of the FDCPA.209  
This raises the question: “why?”  The blatantly academic answer is that the 
FDCPA does not require collectors to use the verbatim language or format 
of the statute.210  The practical answer is that debt collection has become a 
lucrative business.  The debt collection industry is worth an estimated 17 
billion dollars.211  The economics of the industry dictates that debt 
collectors must be vigilant and innovative in the methods they use to 
navigate and circumvent the law.  The only recourse left to consumers is to 
know their rights and demand accountability from those members of the 
industry not willing to play by the rules. 
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